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S INCE THE END OF THE 1980S, Israel appears to haveentered a fundamental transformation.  From amilitarized economy characterized by large government
deficits, heavy dependency on the US and intense stagflation,
there is now a decisive move toward peace and regional
integration, economic growth and declining military
spending. These developments come amidst a deep ideological
and cultural change sanctioning the centrist/liberal world view
of the Labour and Meretz parties. Increasingly, there are calls
not only for a more open foreign policy but for an entirely
different regime based on political democratization, economic
liberalization and a dismantling of the welfare state. The
Zionist-collectivist ethos seems to have finally given way to the
universal creed of business enterprise.
The purpose of the article is to offer an alternative
analytical framework for understanding this long-term
transformation. First, we argue against the conventional
separation between the ‘political system’ and the ‘economic
61
Since the late 1980s, Israel has been undergoing a profound
transformation, characterized by reconciliation with its Arab
neighbours and attempts to reintegrate into the regional economy,
a transition from a militarized economy to open markets, and a
decline of the collectivist ethos in favour of liberalism and free
enterprise. This transition, we argue, is part of a world-wide shift
from the ‘depth’ to the ‘breadth’ of accumulation and the parallel
globalization of ownership. In order to survive, the large Israeli
corporations must substitute outward expansion for the old
protectionism of a militarized economy, and give up domestic
control in return for global alliances.
From War Profits to Peace
Dividends: The New Political
Economy of Israel
by Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler
Introduction
system.’ This method has been popular among Israeli scholars
but its analytical value is open to doubt. Second, instead of the
common aggregate/statist approach, we take the disaggregate
route of political economy, accentuating the historical role
played by key power groups. And, finally, rather than focus
merely on domestic considerations, we claim that both the
earlier military economy as well as the current trajectory into
‘peace markets’ are part of broader global developments,
particularly the internationalization of business institutions
and the changing nature of the capitalist nation state.
In our opinion, the sharp ‘U-Turn’ in Israeli history is
intimately linked to the changing nature of capital
accumulation and corporate concentration, both in Israel and
in the US. For the large core firms at the centre of the
economy, which we view as principal actors in this process,
accumulation and concentration are two side of the same
process. With the evolution of modern capitalism, the leading
firms are increasingly driven not to maximize their profits but
rather to ‘beat the average.’ Specifically, they seek to achieve a
differential rate of accumulation—that is, to exceed the average
rate of return in the economy. Since a differential growth in
profits implies control over a growing share of the aggregate
capitalized assets, for these firms the goal of accumulation
means a quest for rising corporate concentration.1
Differential accumulation can be achieved in two ways. One
is to raise the ‘depth of accumulation’ by maintaining profit
margins above the economy’s average. The other is to focus on
the ‘breadth of accumulation’ by expanding market share.
Although the two methods are not mutually exclusive,
economic conditions which are conducive to one often
undermine the other. During the 1970s and much of the 1980s,
Israel and the US were both characterized by a political-
economic structure in which a combination of corporate
concentration and stunted growth gave rise to ‘military
Keynesianism’—much along the lines outlined by Luxemburg,
Hilferding, and the Monopoly-Capital school of Baran and
Sweezy. Under these circumstances, corporate concentration is
typically maintained and enhanced by expanding the depth of
accumulation: the large corporations try to raise their profit
margins above those of smaller periphery firms and the ensuing
‘profit competition’ often culminates in a stagflationary spiral
(Nitzan 1992). However, since the mid 1980s, and particularly
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with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the opening to
business of China, India and South-East Asia, the large firms
both in Israel and in the US have changed gear, moving toward
an alternative model of peaceful expansion. This pattern of
accumulation was anticipated and described by Schumpeter
and by Kautsky (who even labelled it as ‘ultra imperialism’).
Under this latter regime, the core corporations advance their
differential position by expanding the breadth of accumulation:
instead of competing over profit margins, the differential
increase in profits comes from a rapid intrusion into new
markets and the consequent expansion of market share. This
mode of differential accumulation is accompanied by falling
military spending, disinflation and revived growth.
The focus on the process of accumulation sheds new light
on the history of Israel. The first section of the article examines
some of the fundamental assumptions underlying the Israeli
political and economic literature of the past three decades.
According to this literature, Israel represents a ‘special case’—
but then, that is so only because most writers have chosen to
ignore the process of accumulation. If the latter is put at the
centre of analysis, Israel’s political-economic history no longer
seems unique. The second section examines briefly the
‘military bias’ of mature capitalist economies, with specific
emphasis on the US. In the third section, we argue that until the
late 1980s, the Israeli military bias has been similarly affected by
pressures emanating from growing corporate concentration, as
well as by the country’s role in the superpower confrontation.
These consideration could then help explain the current peace
process. In the fourth section, we claim that fundamental
changes in the global pattern of accumulation have left the
Israeli elite (and many of the Arab ones) with little choice but
to accept the imperative of open boarders and global
ownership. In a certain sense, the current enthusiasm for peace
is similar to the earlier obsession with national security: they
both serve the quest for differential accumulation.
1.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The Israeli literature dealing with the economics and politics
of war and peace suffers from several related shortcomings: (1)
An emphasis on the ‘statist’ frame of reference, (2) a view that
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the historical development of Israel was predetermined by
‘unique’ circumstances, and (3) a belief that as a consequence
of these circumstances, Israel has developed into a ‘special
case’ of classless society; a society in which the process of
capital accumulation and the role of elites could be safely
ignored. We deal with these issues in turn.
The ‘statist’ or ‘state-centred’ approach grew increasingly
fashionable since the 1970s (Tilly 1975; Krasner 1978; and
Skocpol 1985; for the Israeli case, see Migdal 1989 and Barnett
1992). The basic unit of analysis here is the nation state, whose
actions are dominated by an amorphous group of ‘central-
decision makers,’ ‘state officials,’ and ‘rulemakers.’ This group
is supposedly driven by the national interest and seeks to
achieve broad macroeconomic goals such as growth and a
favourable balance of payments, or macropolitical aims like
military prowess and social stability (for instance Arian 1989).
These broad ends are emphasized for their universality and
perceived as independent of particular interests.
The aims of the state are formulated in aggregate terms—a
habit of thinking which emerged and consolidated with the
Keynesian paradigm (Tsuru 1968). Society is divided into two
systems of ‘economics’ and ‘politics.’ In the Israeli context, it is
assumed that the economic system would guarantee universal
welfare—that is, if only it were allowed to function ‘efficiently.’
The political system often undermines that efficiency when it
seeks to achieve additional goals such as ‘national security’ but
fails to find the optimal rate of substitution between security
and economic growth along the nation’s production-
possibilities frontier. With its foundations deeply embedded in
the neoclassical paradigm, the focus on ‘aggregate welfare’
enables the writer to remain within the boundaries of the
national consensus (Robinson 1962: 117-18), and has driven
many Israeli academics to accept the supremacy of the
political echelon.
Thus, Berglas (1970) asserts that ‘the central problem of the
economic policy in Israel is choosing the right point on the
curve [production possibilities frontier],’ yet he immediately
adds that this choice must be determined by ‘security
considerations’ which are ‘beyond the domain of this article’
(p.194). That particular article was written at a sensitive
period, right at the end of the Israel-Egyptian war of
attrition—though time has done little to change the author’s
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basic presumption. Thirteen years later, after the 1982 Israeli
entanglement in Lebanon, Berglas still claims that ‘the purpose
of military expenditures [in Israel] is both to deter potential
enemies from starting a war and to achieve superiority once a
war has started,’ and that ‘it is thus difficult even in retrospect
to assess the success or failure of a military expenditure
program’ (Berglas 1983: 16). Likewise, Hasid and Lesser, while
working as senior economists at the Ministry of Security,
asserted that although ‘Israeli society is democratic, free, peace
seeking and striving for standard and quality of living much
like the progressive western states, Israel is coerced into a
permanent state of war.’ In this context, they explained, ‘the
allocation of resources for security involves national risks
which are very difficult to assess in any objective way’ (1981:
243). These assertions may be all true of course, but then if all
the crucial historical decisions are determined by autonomous
state officials, uncompromising Arab regimes and ideological
inclinations, why the scientific pretensions of rational
‘economism’?
The total subjugation of the economy to the state is
manifest in Sadan (1985: 119), an economics professor and
general manager of the finance ministry at the time: ‘In Israel,’
he asserted, ‘economic goals arise naturally from the general
goal of the survival of the state.’ Indeed, ‘planning for survival
includes economic growth, and even when this is not an
objective in and of itself, it is a means for making possible the
establishment of the defense system required for future wars.’
The Hobbesian view has been so thoroughly accepted in Israeli
political literature that some researchers have decided to skip
the analysis altogether and turn directly to policy implications.
Klieman (1992), for example, still has little doubt about value
of Israeli militarism. For him, the main issue is the benefit for
the ‘state,’ and the principal question is, ‘how could Israel best
respond to mounting challenges in the global weapon market
and how should it preserve its position and competitive
advantage?’ (p.326) His answer is that Israel ‘…should
continue with its tradition of domestic dexterity and external
cunning’! (p.336).
The substitution of advice for serious research is typical of
an academic community captured by rigid consensus. Perhaps
the clearest expression of this consensus is the repeated use—
often unconscious—of terms such as ‘we,’ ‘us’ and ‘ours,’
New Political Economy of Israel 65
usually coupled with a need for ‘sacrifice’ (on the concept of
‘we,’ see Barnet 1972: 7). Aharoni (1969), for example,
describes how ‘we are required, and justly so, to demonstrate
resilience and hold out against political and economic
pressures,’ while ‘our young are called for a long reserve
service and bloodletting’ (p.157). Although Aharoni hinted
that the Labour government of Golda Meir should re-evaluate
its priorities, he was also quick to add that this was ‘not to
doubt the need to devote whatever is necessary in order to
assure our very survival’ (p.160). And once defense cuts are
ruled out, an economist can step in to announce that ‘if we
want to enjoy this kind of growth in the future, we must begin
immediately by rapidly reducing the standard of living’
(Berglas 1970: 195).
The adoption of the state-centred approach by Israeli
academics was greatly facilitated by the view of Israel as a sui
generis case. The first reason is exogenous.  Unlike many other
democracies, we are told, ‘Israel’s very survival has been
threatened for many years’ so ‘one cannot apply the concept of
military-industrial complex to this Western-style democracy
in the sense of a conspiracy by heads of the political, defense
and economic establishment solely for the sake of furthering
their own interests (Mintz 1984: 104).  Following a similar
vain, Peri (1983: 1) writes that ‘the all-encompassing nature of
war in Israel and the centrality of security to national existence
have created a situation whereby numerous spheres, which in
parliamentary democracies are considered “civil”, fall within
the security ambit and are enveloped in secrecy.’  And so,
‘Beyond the ideological and political disagreements prevailing
in the Israeli public,’ write Horowitz and Lissak (1988: 28),
‘there was always a broad consensus regarding the threat for
survival embedded in the Israeli-Arab dispute’ (see also
Horowitz and Lissak 1989, ch.6).  The consequence was that
Israel became a unique case.  ‘Unfortunately,’ writes Ben Dor
(1977: 431), ‘in the current state of the theoretical literature,
Israel constitutes such an exceptional case of a “nation in
arms” (a “barrack democracy”), that it is almost impossible to
compare it to any other similar case.’  And, ‘In spite of the
many references to Israel and the IDF in comparative works
on civil-military relations, none of the existing conceptual
frameworks in the field appear fully applicable to the case of
Israel’ (Horowitz 1982: 96).
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The second reason for the uniqueness of Israel stems from
its own ‘primordial sin’: the East-European founding fathers
instituted an authoritarian ‘socialist’ culture which, according
to the overwhelming majority of Israeli social scientists, has
since lied at the heart of the ‘Israeli malaise.’ Beginning in the
1920s, the political system has seized control of the economy,
first through the Labour party and the Histadrut (federation of
labour unions), which then transferred their power to the
government of the newly-formed state. The result was the
institutionalization of an authoritarian/statist culture. Shapiro
(1975: 207-8), for example, believes that contrary to the basic
individualistic-liberal principles of western society, Israel has
failed to maintain the necessary separation between economics
and politics and allowed the public-political domain to
impinge upon the private-economic sphere (also Shapiro
1977; Arian 1989; Aharoni 1991). The consequences for Israeli
society were detrimental. The petrifying of political
dominance since the British Mandate era has created grave
‘distortions,’ mostly associated with the evils a ‘socialistic
tradition’ and excessive ‘government intervention’ (Halevi and
Klinov-Malul 1968: 4). From the new-right perspective of
Sharkansky, ‘the predominance of the government in Israel’s
economy makes it the most socialist country outside the
Eastern Bloc’ and so ‘It is Israel’s fate to suffer the worst from
the centrally controlled east and the democratic west’ (1987:
5). The model, then, is simple: a socialist tradition inevitably
gives rise to a statist bureaucracy, which undermines the
vitality of private enterprise and brings chronic stagnation.
Clearly, Israel is like no other capitalist society. Its history is
the result of ‘the trilateral relationship between the settlement
movement, the pioneering elite which exercised its control
through the political parties and the bureaucratic stratum
which recognized its hegemony’ (Shapiro 1984: 45). It is ‘a
party state in which almost everything is determined by
political parties’ (Goldberg 1992: 16). According to Arian
(1985), power, and hence the historical course of Israeli
society, lie within the formal political sphere, in the hands of
the political elites. 
This convention about the primacy of politics and ‘decision
makers’ serves not only to separate the study of politics and
economics, but also to divert attention from the class structure
of Israel. Indeed, since control is in the hands of politicians
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and former army officers, and since these do not generally
come from a capitalist background, it goes without saying that
class conflict is irrelevant to the Israeli case. Israel, so it seems,
is a classless society in which the process of capital
accumulation, the growth and consolidation of a ruling class,
the ownership of resources, the distribution of income, the
control of economic power, the methods of persuasion and
legitimation and the means of violence could all be safely
ignored. Paradoxically, if there is any recognition of ‘class
struggle’ in Israel, it is largely limited to the pre-Independence
era—a period in which the society was hardly industrialized,
in which there was barely any accumulation of capital or a
meaningful working class, in which the most organized groups
were the agricultural cooperatives, and in which the army and
the police were those of a colonial power (Giladi 1973; Yatziv
1979). Since the 1970s, however, when these characteristics
where long gone, replaced by a highly concentrated business
structure, international economic integration, a developed
industrial system of mass production and an urban
amalgamation of wage earners—there is no single study about
the Israeli ruling class or the process of accumulation, let alone
the connection between them.
2.  THE ‘MILITARY BIAS’2
An alternative assessment of Israeli history could begin from a
theoretical framework linking the process of capitalist
development and crisis with military spending, expansionary
foreign policy and armed conflict. Early Marxist writers such
as Hilferding (1910) and Luxemburg (1913), and
institutionalists like Veblen (1904; 1923), saw the tendency
toward economic and military expansionism as an outgrowth
of the concentration of capital in the leading industrialized
countries of their time. Later authors, such as Kalecki (1972),
Tsuru (1961), Sweezy (1972) and Steindl (1976), claimed that
a rising ‘degree of monopoly’ created a tendency for the
societal surplus to rise while at the same time limiting the
extent to which this surplus could be ‘offset’ by profitable
investment outlets. The historical solution appeared in the
form of ‘military Keynesianism,’ where a ‘Keynesian coalition’
between big business and organized labour administers rising
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military spending and a more aggressive foreign policy as a
means of maintaining aggregate prosperity and high
employment (Gold 1977). Other writers took a step further,
suggesting that the militarization of the economy was driven
not by the aggregate needs of employment and output, but
rather by the profit requirements of the largest ‘core’ firms of
the ‘monopoly sector’ (O’Connor 1973) or ‘monopoly capital’
(Baran and Sweezy 1966).
Conceptually, much of this research was concerned with
the effect of economic structure on military spending.
However, with continuous US involvement in South-East Asia
it became increasingly clear that causality ran both ways and
that military expenditures were in turn a factor of
restructuring. One of the first to recognize this double-sided
link was Kalecki (1964; 1967), who predicted that the growing
involvement of the US in Vietnam would shift the balance of
power from the ‘old’ civilian industries in the east coast to the
‘new’ military-oriented groups in the west. Rising military
budgets, he argued, would redistribute income in favour of the
latter and fortify the ‘angry elements’ within the US ruling
class, leading to what Melman (1985) later called a ‘permanent
war economy.’ 
It now appears that Kalecki was right, and that the war
economy, which in the US lasted until the late 1980s, has
indeed shifted the gravity centre of US business in favour of
arms contractors. For the large US-based companies, the post-
war international decline of the US economy spelled a
predicament of excess capacity. This was partly counteracted
by mergers and acquisitions, though the more pronounced
response was a growing reliance on government budgets—
particularly in the area of military, space and medical
technology. The consequence of this ‘military bias’ was a
heightened process of differential accumulation in favour of
the large arms contractors, who between the Vietnam War and
the late 1980s saw their profit share in the big economy soaring
(Nitzan, Rowley and Bichler 1989; Nitzan and Bichler 1995).
These considerations prove significant for the Israeli case in
two ways. One is a striking structural similarity involving a
direct link between military spending and market structure.
The Marxist thesis of ‘military Keynesianism’—that is, the
counter-cyclical use of military spending to achieve
macroeconomic goals—may have been adequate for the 1950s
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and 1960s when rising defense spending came together with
overall economic expansion (Melman 1985). This thesis seems
less robust, however, from the 1970s onward. Military
procurement has become concentrated in a relatively small
number of large companies, and as the dependency of these
firms on military budgets increased, the flexibility of the US
administration in manipulating these budgets tended to
decline. (Indeed, the drop in military spending since the late
1980s would have been far more difficult to implement had it
not been for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of
global investment outlets through NAFTA, GATT and the
‘emergence’ of Latin America and Asia.) 
If we can generalize, it seems that under certain historical
conditions, particularly in an early state of development or
after a severe structural crisis, military expenditures can play a
macroeconomic role, as argued by Benoit (1973) who
described their effect on developing countries. But as the
economy ‘matures,’ and the degree of concentration and
centralization surpasses a certain threshold, military spending
becomes less able in serving overall economic goals, and is
catering more to the interest of dominant political and
business groups. In this latter stage, the macroeconomic
impact of such expenditures often become stagflationary
(Smith 1977), but that is tolerated given their positive effect on
the leading firms at the core (Griffin et al 1982). The Israeli
economy, we argue, followed a similar historical pattern, with
military spending initially associated with overall growth and
subsequently accompanied by rising corporate concentration
and heightened stagflation.
Second, beyond the structural similarities there is also a
direct connection between the military bias in the two
economies. Since the late 1960s, Israel was becoming
increasingly integrated into the US orbit—a process which was
partly a result of global expansion by US arms producers.
During the period between the late 1960s and late 1970s, when
US domestic military spending experienced a cyclical
downturn, arms exports became increasingly crucial to the
well being of the defense contractors—firstly as a stop-gap
measure for falling orders at home, and secondly because of
their higher profit margins. The most significant factor
affecting the rise of arms exports was the global redistribution
of income following the 1973 oil crisis. The explosive growth
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of oil revenues made the OPEC countries ideal clients for
weaponry and, in 1974, after the US exist from Vietnam, the
Middle East became the world’s largest importer of weaponry. 
The military bias of the Israeli economy coincided with this
US foray into the armament market of the Middle East. Israel
accepted its role as a US regional satellite, in return for massive
military aid and US consent for economic protectionism. For
the large US arms contractors, military sales to Israel quickly
became part of a heightened arms race, which drew even larger
clients such as Iran and Saudi Arabia into the cycle. For the
large Israeli firms, the combination of a war economy and
trade barrier proved equally beneficial, generating rising profit
margins and a rapid surge in differential accumulation.
3. MACROECONOMIC HISTORY IN STRUCTURAL
RETROSPECT
In assessing the parallels and interactions between the US and
Israeli economies, it is instructive to begin with a bird-eye view
of Israel’s economic structure during the height of its
militaristic phase. Our analysis follows the dual-economy
approach which emphasises the firm rather than the industry
(Steindl 1945; Edwards 1979; Bowring 1986). Furthermore,
given our focus on differential accumulation, we look
specifically at the distribution of profits rather than standard
proxies such as sales or value added.
During the mid-1980s, the Israeli dual-economy was
characterised by a ‘big-economy’ of about 50 firms, and a
‘small economy’ comprising the rest of the business sector and
NGOs. The big economy consists of a core of five
conglomerates—Leumi, Hapoalim, Israel Discount
Bankholding (IDBH), Koor and Clal (the latter being
controlled by the first three)—surrounded by a perimeter of
somewhat smaller and far less diversified firms. The firms of
the big economy dominate almost every significant business
sector in Israel.
The history of the core conglomerates mirrors that of
Israel. Bank Leumi was established in 1902 to finance Zionist
colonial settlements. Bank Hapoalim was formed in 1921 to
support cooperative activity in agriculture, construction and
industry. IDBH began as a private bank in 1936, when capital
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flight from recession-hit Europe and British war preparations
fuelled an economic boom in Palestine. Koor was established
in 1944 as the industrial subsidiary of Solel Bonhe, after war
spending had turned the latter into the largest contractor in
the Middle East. Clal was set up in 1962 as a joint venture
designed to lure foreign investment through tax incentives and
subsidies, and eventually became a ‘gravity centre’ for the
domestic core groups, the government and foreign investors. 
Over time, cross ownership, kinship and cultural ties,
procurement rights, credit arrangements and a complicated
web of unwritten conventions and ‘understandings’ among
the core groups, the lesser firms at the periphery of the big
economy and the government, have given rise to an Israeli
ruling class. (For a rare exposition of these arrangements, see
Bejsky et al. 1986). Since the 1970s, the cohesion of this class
has been reflected in converging business performance among
the member companies of the big economy—particularly with
regard to tax rates, subsidies, executive compensations and,
most importantly, profits.3
In contrast to the big economy which in many respects acts
like a single ‘bloc,’ the small economy is much more amenable
to standard industrial analysis. Firms are small, usually
operate in a single industry and often own a single plant;
performance is subject to wide fluctuations with little or no
inter-company correlation. Contrary to the big economy,
‘business’ is generally separate from ‘politics,’ with the link
established only indirectly through loose professional
associations and pressure groups.
The ramification of this duality, illustrated in Figure 1, was
a heightened process of differential accumulation. The core
groups of the big economy began their ascent already during
the 1960s, but it was since the 1970s that their differential
accumulation became patently clear: between the mid 1970s
and mid 1980s, when stagflation, military spending and
current account crises undermined the earnings in the ‘small
economy,’ profits for the core groups soared.4
Such conflicting developments point to the shortcomings
of macroeconomic and macropolitical analyses. When
redistribution becomes systematic and overall outcomes
consist of opposing underlying currents, the universal ‘we’ is
not only insufficient, but actually misleading. A structural
focus becomes imperative.
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The interaction between macroeconomic development and
differential accumulation in Israel could be perceived as
belonging to three distinct ‘regimes’: (1) The period of 1955-
1972, characterised by emphasis on the differential breadth of
accumulation, with rapid macroeconomic growth and ‘latent’
structural consolidation, (2) the 1973-1984 era, in which the
emphasis shifted to the differential breadth of accumulation
accompanied by severe stagflation, and (3) the post-1985 era
distinguished by retrenchment for the big economy, followed
by a shift toward an open ‘peace economy’ and a return to the
differential breadth of accumulation.
These broad contours are illustrated in Figure 2, (over page)
where we contrast the economy’s macroeconomic perform-
ance, indicated by GDP growth, with a proxy for differential
accumulation, given by the ratio of the net profits of the five
core conglomerates to GDP. Until 1972, the economy
expanded at an average annual rate of 10 per cent, while
differential accumulation by the core conglomerates was
relatively contained below one half of one per cent. The 1973-
1985 period was fundamentally different: there was a marked
drop in overall growth rates, to an average of 3 per cent, and as
Figure 1. Real Net Profits (1980 NIS, three-year moving average)
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stagnation lingered, the profit share of the core firms started to
rise rapidly, climbing to a peak of nearly 2.3 per cent of GDP.
From the mid-1980s onward, differential accumulation for the
core firms turned negative and their profit share of GDP
rapidly collapsed, reaching less than 0.75 per cent by 1990. The
political-economic shift since the late 1980s has contributed to
revived overall growth, now accompanied by a parallel
recovery for the core companies. In this section we deal with
the first two regimes. The third phase is discussed in the fourth
section.
Until 1972, economic growth in Israel was disproportion-
ately affected by two ‘external’ stimuli: (1) the unilateral
capital inflow of German compensation between 1955 and
1965, and (2) the ‘Palestinians boom’ in the immediate years
after the 1967 War. During the 1955-1965 period, unilateral
transfers from Germany accounted for most of the capital
inflow, and were almost identical to the annual change in
GNP. The end of these transfers in 1965 was followed by the
severe recession of 1966-1967. The situation changed again in
1968, when the Israeli market suddenly expanded to include
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Figure 2. Macroeconomic Growth and Differential Accumulation
(Per cent, five-year moving average)
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one million new consumers from the occupied territories of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Furthermore, until 1973, fast
increases in the number of Palestinian employees working in
Israel augmented purchasing power. This combination of an
overnight expansion of markets and a rapid process of
proletarianization had a decisive multiplier effect on the Israeli
economy. But, then, during the mid 1970s, when the growth in
the number of Palestinians working in Israel started to
decelerate, the economy reverted back to stagnation.5
These external impetuses acted to mitigate the latent
process of aggregate concentration, primarily through their
positive impact on the small economy. However, after 1974,
with the growing differential accumulation by the big
economy, the dynamics changed. The concentration process
came into the open, accompanied by a fundamental political
shift and the gradual decline of the government as a central
economic force. The right-wing Likud bloc which assumed
power in 1977, adopted an aggressive foreign policy and high
military spending, while its ‘liberal’ economic agenda of laissez
faire hastened the ascent of the core conglomerates.
The core conglomerates of today consolidated during the
mixed-economy period after Independence. Until the early
1960s, investment was almost entirely financed by unilateral
capital transfers and managed more or less exclusively by the
government. The allocation of capital was determined partly
by the government’s import-substitution policies, but also by
political and family ties. The government developed ‘special
relationships’ with several rising business clusters which were
originally considered as ‘national agents’ and eventually grew
into the core groups of today (Patinkin 1963; Barkai 1964).
These relationships started to shape immediately after
Independence with the distribution of land and other
properties belonging to the Palestinians who left during the
war; it developed further during the ‘Austerity’ regime of the
early 1950s which saw the allocation of exclusive certificates,
monopolies, procurement rights and other forms of ‘good will’
to well-connected domestic and foreign groups; and it
consolidated with the inflow of German compensation
payments which financed a decade of growth between 1956
and 1965.
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The Era of
Rapid Growth
and Structural
Formation,
-
The 1950s were a period of sharp contrasts. On the one
hand, massive Jewish immigration from Europe, Asia and
Africa more than doubled the population in just a few years.
The immigrants were mainly impoverished refugees, with little
marketable skills, often without knowledge of the language.
Acute shortages arrested per capital growth, yet with the
population expanding at over 9 per cent annually, overall
economic activity was nonetheless booming. Given the
economic dominance of the government, the business
potential for politically-connected groups was huge. And
indeed, by the early 1950s, only a few years after
Independence, companies such as the Discount group have
already grown ‘too large’ for the domestic market and began
facing problems of excess capacity typical to mature
economies (Recanati 1984: 71, 92-93).
The rapid expansion of public services and the acceleration
of the Israeli-Arab conflict after the 1956 Suez War further
accentuating the centrality of the government and boosted the
significance of the military elites. Yet under the surface, these
developments ushered a more fundamental process of
corporate concentration. Foreign unilateral transfers and
loans induced aggregate growth, but their allocation was
highly unequal. During the 1950s and 1960s, growth was
propelled more by government grants and subsidized loans
than the ‘animal spirits’ of capitalists—so much so, that for the
leading businessmen at the receiving end accumulation often
took place before production even started! This allocation
system, known as the ‘Sapir Method’ after the finance minister
at the time, encouraged binding institutional arrangements
and centralization—though, for a while, its negative effect on
economic growth was more than offset by the continuous flow
of immigrants and foreign assistance. It was only since the
early 1970s, when these external stimuli were no longer
available, that the economy entered its monopolistic stage of
‘militarized stagflation.’
Since the early 1970s, economic activity was rapidly
converging around two related poles—defense and finance.
Earlier forays into military-related manufacturing were often
explained by Israel’s political isolation, though even then
economic considerations were at least equally important.
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Initially, domestic production of weapons fitted nicely with the
Labour government’s import-substitution effort, while, later,
military exports were seen as a possible solution to the
country’s chronic current-account deficit. Financial activity
became increasingly significant, much like in other capitalist
countries, as a consequence of a merger wave during the 1960s
and early 1970s. At the centre of this process stood the would-
be core conglomerates which started to form already during
the 1950s from the amalgamation of small family banks and
saving and loans cooperatives.6 Their expansion began in
earnest, however, only during the 1965-66 recession, when the
government’s austerity policy triggered a massive wave of
business consolidation. and stripped labour cooperatives of
their remaining autonomy.7 Since the early 1970s, the
government also started liquidating its direct industrial
holdings, moving toward indirect intervention through
subsidies and military contracts.
From the early 1970s onward, the growth of the large
conglomerates came to depend increasingly on the differential
depth rather than breadth of accumulation. This was achieved
in three principal ways. First, mergers and acquisitions
brought a larger share of the profit under the control of these
firms, enabling them to better control competition and
prevent an unruly rise in capacity. Second, with civilian
production entering a period of protracted stagnation,
resources started shifting into financial activity and inflation
began to rise. The conglomerate’s financial assets where
inflated relative to the economy’s total, and the share of labour
eroded. Finally and perhaps most importantly, the
intensification of the Israeli-Arab conflict contributed to rising
military spending and growing arms exports. This burdened
the aggregate economy, but much like in the US, the ensuing
‘military bias’ was highly beneficial, both relatively and
absolutely, to the leading arms contractors of the big economy.
Moreover, high tariff barriers, capital subsidies, grants and tax
exemptions to support the militarized economy contributed
further to the ascent of its large conglomerates.
This pattern of ‘military/financial accumulation’ was
typical to all of the core firms. The Discount group (IDBH),
for example, entered the military sector during the late 1960s.
Through its subsidiary, Discount Investment Corporation, the
company acquired numerous holdings in the military sector
New Political Economy of Israel 77
(usually in association with tax-exempt foreign partners),
which within a few years began accounting for a rising share of
IDBH’s overall profits. The main outlet for these profits was
the flourishing stock market, where IDBH-run mutual and
pension funds were increasingly active in stock manipulation.
Much like IDBH, Koor too was enjoying the post-war
prosperity. Riding the military multiplier and boosted by
cheap credit from Bank Hapoalim, the group’s labour force
more than doubled to 22,000 in 1974, up from only 10,000 in
1967, and net earnings soared. Operations were grouped into
13 ‘brigades’ along military-bureaucratic principles. Top
managerial position were staffed by retired army officers and
financial decision were centralized. Although still nominally
owned by its own workers (as well as by all other members of
the Histadrut), the company was now behaving much like any
other capitalist enterprise, with a rising ratio between
executive compensation and factory-floor wages. Strategically,
Koor concentrated on acquiring dozens of companies
rendered vulnerable by the 1965-6 recession. The biggest
incursion was into defense—particularly through Koor
Trading which dealt with arms exports, and Tadiran which
acted as a principal weapon producer.
The Clal group also began to grow along similar lines
during the 1960s. After a few difficult years, the group was
taken over by Bank Hapoalim, IDBH and others. From 1969
onward, Clal expanded via conglomerate mergers and
acquisitions, financed largely with subsidized government
loans (Aharoni 1976: 299). Most significantly, Clal has
developed into the ‘gravity centre’ of the big economy—both
by virtue of its ownership structure, as well as through a dense
network of joint ventures with the other core conglomerates.
Finally, much like the other groups, Clal too was becoming
dependent on both military and finance. Notably, the growing
‘military bias’ of all of these groups was accompanied by the
ascent of many retired IDF generals and chiefs of staff into
their top managerial positions.
The interaction between military and finance in Israel was
not incidental. The country’s large military-related deficits
were financed partly by grants and loans from the US, but
mostly by a bulging domestic debt. The arrangement was
doubly beneficial for the core conglomerates, who enjoyed the
benefit of government indexed bonds on top of their thriving
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arms business. Capitalists often object to large government
deficits on grounds that these serve to ‘crowd out’ private
investment, though in the closed war economy of the 1970s
and early 1980s, the large Israeli capitalists had little to lose
from this arrangement. True, massive government borrowing
contributed to three-digit real rates of interest, but these
hardly hurt the core conglomerates. First, their virtual
monopoly over credit helped them maintain the real spread
between lending and borrowing rates at 20-50 per cent and,
second, the effect on their profit of a high interest-rate regime
was more then offset by political ties which assured cost-plus
government contracts, subsidized loans and low taxes.
Moreover, to the extent that monetized deficits contributed to
inflation, their positive effect on profits and the value of
financial assets far outweighed their impact on rising wages.
Despite these benefits, since the 1970s there was growing
pressure for a greater ‘liberalization’ of capital markets. The
goal, though, had little to do with improving ‘allocative
efficiency.’ Indeed, when the government began reducing its
directed loans, gross investment plummeted—falling to about
15 per cent of GDP in 1985, down from 30 per cent ten years
earlier. The real reason behind the liberalization push was that
the core conglomerates discovered a new gold mine—the
stock market. Tight collusion, particularly among the large
banks, enabled them to manipulate the price of their own
shares—as well as those of many others—to the point of
guaranteeing investors a predetermined real rate of return! In
the words of the Bejsky Commission (Bejsky et al. 1986: 59),
the banks were able to create a ‘new type of security’
combining the properties of shares and indexed bonds in the
same paper. But in order to maximize the benefit of this
invention, the government had to be pushed out and that
required ‘liberalization.’ 
The gradual withdrawal of the government gave rise to a
‘parallel monetary policy’ managed by the big banks: on the
one hand, their systematic stock manipulation was
tantamount to printing money, while on the other, the
consequent market buoyancy enabled them to ‘absorb’ much
of this newly created money by issuing new stocks. The
consequence was a rapid inflationary redistribution of income.
The principal winners where shareholders, particularly the
banks themselves: they became the biggest owners of their own
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stocks whose value in 1982 reached 44 per cent of the
economy’s aggregate liquid assets, up from only 7 per cent in
1973 (Bejsky et al. 1986: 61). 
The concentration process now emerged with all of its
consequences. Since the 1970s, with the external stimuli of
immigration, capital inflows and market expansion all gone,
the focus of accumulation shifted from breadth to depth. By
now, the economy had already accumulated a dense network
of ‘distributional coalitions’ (to borrow Olson’s terminology),
whose interests lied in stagflation rather than growth and price
stability. The process of corporate concentration and income
redistribution undermined the political power of organized
labour and restricted purchasing power. The economy began
to suffer from ‘excess capacity’—that is, an excess over what
could be sold at profitable prices. For firms in the big
economy, business success was thus increasingly dependent
on limiting the growth of capacity and on using inflation to
raise their share in the stagnating pie. And indeed, between
1973 and 1986, net investment dropped a full 76 per cent,
while inflation rose to over 400 per cent in the mid 1980s, up
from less than 20 per cent in the early 1970s (Statistical
Abstract of Israel, various years). It was during this macro-
economic crisis that the large Israeli conglomerates
experienced their fastest expansion (Figure 2).
In summary, since the 1970s, Israel was increasingly
characterized by a dual-economy dominated by several large
core conglomerates whose differential accumulation was
sustained mainly through raising the depth of accumulation.
The principal vehicles were armament and finance—the first
supported by the accelerating Israeli-Arab conflict and the
growing superpower involvement in the region, the latter by
intensifying stagflation. The Israeli government was getting
deeper into debt—with domestic debt services accrued
principally to the big economy, and with foreign payments
helping support the export drive of US-based military
contractors. In the course of this process, Israel’s power
structure was radically transformed. The core conglomerates
grew increasingly intertwined through a web of cross-
ownership, business, political and kinship ties. The
government, on the other hand, gradually lost its central role
in the economy, moving from direct economic involvement,
to indirect support and subsidization of the big economy, and
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eventually to passive mediation between the large domestic
conglomerates, the leading American-based armament
companies and the US Administration. The dominant-party
system of the 1950s and 1960s had given way to a dominant-
capital system.
But then the militarized order collapsed. Major weapon
development projects were cancelled under US pressure,
Israeli arms producers started losing money and the military
industry—for years the celebrated ‘crown jewel’ of ‘Israeli
know-how’—suddenly turned into a ‘burden.’ The question is
why? What made the military-business elite reverse its course?
Why was the old order of war profits falling apart and what
brought the new regime of ‘peace dividends’?
4.  FROM WAR PROFITS TO PEACE DIVIDENDS:
THE NEW ORDER
Israel’s transition into a new era of peace has been affected by
several domestic and regional developments, but these must
be understood within the broader transformation of global
capitalism, particularly in the realm of ownership. Whereas
until recently, globalization occurred mainly in the realm of
production, the current phase extends globalization into the
realm of ownership.
The globalization of ownership is intimately linked with a
worldwide shift from the differential depth of accumulation to
the differential breadth of accumulation. The main backdrop
is the growing interaction between the developed and
‘emerging’ markets. For the local elites in the emerging
markets, the first stage of transition often appears in the form
of severe economic crisis and a threat to the institutions
underlying the differential depth of accumulation. Thus, in
Brazil, the debt crisis of the 1980s undermined the entreguista
(collaborator) state; in India, the foreign exchange crisis of the
early 1990s brought an end to the protectionism of the ‘license
raj’; in South Africa, the nose-dive of gold prices after 1980 put
a seal on the ‘labour shortage’ rationale of apartheid; and in
Israel, the collapse of the war economy and the bursting of the
stock market bubble eliminated the main mechanisms of
internal redistribution (Bichler and Nitzan 1996a; Nitzan
1996a). Following the crisis, the second stage is almost
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invariably associated with a fundamental rethinking of the link
between capital and the state. With the ideological collapse of
communism and Keynesianism, there is a growing recognition
that the ‘natural right of investment’—that is, the customary
right to control a portion of the societal surplus—could no
longer be secured solely by domestic legitimation, and must
increasingly rely on global market power. The depth of
accumulation declines in significance and the breadth of
accumulation comes to the fore. The external manifestation of
this process is the falling of trade barriers and the greater
reliance on private investment flows.
For the local business groups, the initial effect often comes
in the form of disintegrating institutional arrangements and a
resulting collapse of their ‘differential rate of return’.  But this
stage is usually short-lived, and is quickly compensated by
privatization and deregulation, as well as by the opportunity to
‘go global’. In South Africa, for instance, the large conglomer-
ates are now willing to accept increasing domestic competition
in return for the removal of capital controls and the ability to
invest internationally (Nitzan 1996a). The situation of the
Israeli core firms is not much different: foreign pressure forces
them to divest locally and expand internationally, particularly
into emerging markets in Asia, Latin America and Europe. 
Renewed emphasis on the differential breadth of
accumulation—a foregone conclusion among the leading
multinational corporations for quite some time—is rapidly
becoming an article of faith also in the periphery countries
(Nitzan 1996b). The main consequence of this new consensus
is the globalization of ownership—initially through cross-
border corporate alliances, and subsequently through the
diffusion of transnational ownership. In this sense, the current
phase of globalization implies a higher stage of absentee
ownership. Although the process is still dominated by western-
based firms, outward investment from developing countries is
on the rise. Furthermore, with the growing significance of
institutional investing, the nationality of owners becomes not
only increasingly difficult to ascertain but also decreasingly
relevant for the process of capitalization.
On the face of it, globalization seems to imply greater
competition. Although global alliances are on the ascent and
the large corporations continue to grow in size, this seems
more than counteracted by the rapid decline of trade and
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investment barriers. Moreover, the opening of the world
economy is accompanied by significant technological changes
and macroeconomics growth. Large populations undergo a
rapid process of proletarianization, which in turn enables the
mushrooming of a vibrant small economy. The latter is also
assisted by the high labour intensity of the information
revolution, which reduces barriers to entry and enables fast
growth with limited capital outlays.
One has to be careful, however, not to equate a growing
small economy with rising ‘competition.’ The real test for the
latter is the direction of differential accumulation—that is, the
extent to which the rate of return of the world’s largest firms
surpasses the average. So far, there is little evidence that this
differential has been undermined by globalization. In fact,
‘freer’ trade and investment may very well contribute toward
faster differential accumulation. First, the growth of the small
economy is at least partly a consequence of a more effective
system of ‘out-sourcing’ by large corporations, which is in
turn tantamount to the progressive ‘absenteeism’ of ownership:
instead of extracting the surplus from its own subsidiaries,
today’s giant corporation operates more as a profit centre,
appropriating the surplus via a long chain of small suppliers.
The fact that the latter system is preferred to the former
suggests it is indeed more profitable. Second, free trade makes
it difficult to object to horizontal mergers and acquisitions,
particularly cross-border ones. By the turn of the twenty first
century, the consequence could well be the emergence of
global dominant capital—this time, with little countervailing
powers and no regulatory body. If that happens, differential
accumulation may accelerate and the degree of global
aggregate concentration may exceed current levels.
The shift of emphasis from depth to breadth in the process
of differential accumulation, together with the consequent
globalization of ownership carry significant political
implications which cannot be analysed here. It seems clear,
however, that one consequence is to heighten the conflict
between McWorld and Jihad (Barber 1992)—that is, between
the advent of democratic institutions and conciliatory foreign
policy on the one hand, and a backlash of religious
fundamentalism and xenophobic nationalism on the other.
The move from a war economy to peaceful accumulation in
Israel is part of this conflict.
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The 1980s marked a severe economic crisis in Israel, with the
differential depth of accumulation running into external and
internal barriers. The principal cause was the demise of the
Soviet Union and the changing political-economic arithmetic
of the Middle East. The oil slump has pushed GDP per capita
in the region’s oil exporting countries down by as much as 30-
80 per cent relative to the hay days of the 1970s and early
1980s. At the same time, the populations of these countries
have more than doubled (Nitzan 1996a: 13-15). The result has
been an ongoing socio-economic crisis and growing political
vulnerability. Western governments now see their main threat
as Islamic fundamentalism, and with the old communist
menace gone, their principal solution is a geo-political
realignment.
The basis of this realignment is a pro-western axis extend-
ing from Turkey, through Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and
Egypt (with possible outliers such as Morocco and Tunisia and
even a future post-Hussain Iraq). This axis is expected to serve
a number of purposes. Militarily, it will constitute an effective
wedge in this hostile area and help protect stability in the
Persian Gulf. Economically, this axis fits well into the
‘emerging-markets’ agenda of multinational corporations, and
assuming the peace drive prevails, US-based companies are
eager to secure their regional position vis à vis competitors
from other countries. Politically, the hope is that lower trade
and investment barriers will boost macroeconomic growth
and that rising standards of living will then provide an
alternative to the anti-western rhetoric of fundamentalist
Islam.
This changing international framework has fatally
undermined the Israeli war economy. Until the mid 1980s, US
arms contractors and oil companies gained from Middle-East
militarization (Nitzan and Bichler 1995). Israel, which
received massive military assistance, was instrumental in
maintaining regional tension, in assisting US arms exports,
and in subversive activity around the world. In return, the
‘deal’ was for the US to let Israel maintain its own military
industries (provided these did not undermine US arms
shipments), as well as to allow it to keep a tightly oligopolistic
market with high import and investment barriers. However,
since the mid 1980s, world recession and a massive drop in
the global demand for arms forced US-based producers to
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fight vigorously for contracts, so Israeli contractors had to
give. The consequences was a decline in domestic military
procurement as opposed to arms imports (which remained
relatively stable), as well as a rapid collapse of Israeli arms
exports (Nitzan 1994). In order to win export orders, Israeli
weapon makers now find it necessary to team up as
subcontractors with US companies. In parallel, since the
1990/91 Gulf War, Israel is no longer seen as a western
watchdog in the region, so US-based companies can now
demand the opening of Israeli markets for imports and
foreign investment. From this perspective, one could argue
that the same US interests which earlier benefited from
Israel’s oligopolistic war economy are now promoting its
transition toward an open peace economy.
For the Israeli core conglomerates, these external
developments came on top of growing internal constraints.
Until the mid-1980s, differential accumulation by these
companies was supported by militarized stagflation which
kept their profit margins way above the economy’s average.
However, like any system of redistribution, this too was
limited by its own barriers. First, inflation threatened to throw
fiscal management out of balance, and the stock market
collapse of 1983 was a clear sign that monetary management
too was getting out of hand. Second, persistent differential
profitability for the big economy meant that the GDP share of
military spending had to rise, which would eventually
suffocate the economy. Moreover, given that local demand fell
short of the necessary threshold for major weapon system
development, arms exports could remain competitive only at
the cost of heavy and rising subsidies. 
Finally, the Palestinian Intifada (uprising) since 1987 was
testing the dual-market relationship between Israel and the
occupied territories. Until the mid 1980s, the West Bank and
Gaza Strip were seen as political and business gold mines
whose benefits in the form of cheap labour and captured
markets far exceeded their ‘maintenance cost.’ However, with
the collapse of oil prices, these costs began to mount. Lower
income remittances from Palestinian workers in the Persian
Gulf put growing pressures on a population already besieged
by a rate of unemployment in excess of 50 per cent, mass
seizure of land, administrative barriers and constant humilia-
tion. The eventual backlash turned the territories into a net
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burden. Under these conditions, continued occupation
threatened the very social fabric of Israeli society and the
legitimacy of its so-called ‘national consensus.’
The convergence of these forces coincided with an
economic slump whose severity paralleled the recessions of
1965-66 and of the early 1970s. In contrasts to the previous
downturns, however, the prospects for the core conglomerates
now looked particularly dim. The earlier periods of stagnation
were accompanied by a heightened military bias and
accelerating inflation which contributed to the differential
depth of accumulation by the core groups and augmented the
aggregate concentration of profit (Figure 2); this time, neither
military spending nor inflation were viable options. A change
of regime seemed imminent. 
And, indeed, much like in the aftermath of the South-African,
Indian, or Brazilian crises, the Israeli business elite, too, has
realized that the old order had finally reached its limit. The
new path was fairly clear. The Israeli conglomerates now had
to focus on expanding their differential breadth of
accumulation, which implied an end to the war economy,
liberalization, ‘flexible’ labour markets, lower trade barriers
and capital decontrols. None of this could be sustained
without peace, and so from 1990 onward, the core
conglomerates grew increasingly vocal in their support of
regional reconciliation.8
The implications are twofold. First, removing the Arab
boycott and creating a perception of a stable regional
environment enable Israeli companies to expand business
connections outside the region. The Middle-East itself offers
future potential for Israeli firms, but the immediate gains are
limited: GDP per capita in most neighbouring countries is
very low, there is little overlap between the Arab demand
profile and Israeli production lines, and suspicion and
hostility still linger (Sagi and Sheinin 1994). The main
promise lies outside the region, particularly in the emerging
markets, and the effects are already evident in the data: as
Figure 3 illustrates, the progressive maturation of Israeli
exports has been recently broken by a rapid foray into the
previously closed emerging markets.
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Second, the process of outward expansion is intimately
related to the changing ownership structure of the core
conglomerates. Over the past several years, direct foreign
investment in Israel (as well as of Israeli companies abroad)
has been rising rapidly (Figure 4, over page). The nature and
extent of this investment marks a sharp departure from past
experience. Whereas earlier, foreign investors had to be
attracted by large grants and generous tax exemptions in order
to compensate for Israel’s high country risk, the current trend
is driven by a desire to establish regional footholds in
preparation for Middle East development. Companies which
have never before operated in Israel, such as Volkswagen,
Nèstle, Citicorp, Cable and Wireless, Shamrock, Enron,
Bechtel, Toyota and many others, are now teaming up with the
Israeli conglomerates.
This process coincides with growing pressure on the core
conglomerates to divest some of their extensive holdings. In
addition, the largest three banks—Hapoalim, Leumi and
Discount—which have been under government control since
the stock market crash of 1983, are up for re-privatization.
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Figure 3. Average Annual Growth Rate (%) of Israeli Exports (in US$)
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Officially, divestment and privatization are sanctioned in the
name of ‘competition’ and ‘efficiency,’ but this merely serves
to conceal the changing nature of absentee ownership. Much
like in South Africa, the ‘attack’ on big business is at least
partly driven by pressure from the Untied States and Europe
to open the Israeli market to foreign investment. But like in
South Africa, the Israeli business elite too is set to benefit from
the ensuing restructuring. The rigid cross-ownership structure
of the core conglomerates was adequate for the earlier regime
of a closed militarized economy. The emphasis was on the
differential depth of accumulation by maintaining above-
average profit margins. This necessitated an intricate system of
mutual ‘understandings’ and institutional arrangements which
were facilitated by cross-ownership and multiple holdings.
The end of this regime, however, eliminated some of the need
for close coordination, and reduced the need for conglomerate
structures. Direct investment is no longer the only means of
controlling the flow of profit, which is now often done more
effectively and with far greater flexibility through portfolio
stock ownership. 
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Figure 4. Foreign Direct Investment (US$ millions)
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These conjectures suggest that we should be careful not to
misinterpret the apparent decline of the core conglomerates.
On the face of it, the pending dismembering of these
companies, the entry of foreign investors and the rise of
smaller groups seem to imply that the Israeli economy is
entering a period of falling concentration and greater
competition. Such conclusions may prove too hasty for two
principal reasons. First, with Israeli outward investment on
the rise, differential accumulation will increasingly depend
on the company’s global position and international owner-
ship ties. On these counts, the core groups are already far
ahead of their smaller counterparts, and their differential
pace of outward expansion suggests the gap will only widen.
Second, with mergers and acquisitions becoming more
commonplace and frequent, our existing definition of Israel’s
dominant capital may prove too rigid. As the pattern of
ownership grows more fluid and unstable, it may be
necessary to go beyond corporate entities and identify the
holdings of key individuals. Such data may be hard to collate,
but the evidence they shall provide will be well worth the
effort.
5.  EPILOGUE
The elections of May 1996 seems to have re-shuffled the
political cards, with the new government, led by the right-wing
Likud bloc, apparently set to slow down the peace process.
Yet, the parameters underlying the current trajectory of capital
accumulation remain unaltered. In the absence of outward
investment and export growth, the core conglomerates will see
their profits plummet and the euphoria of foreign investor will
quickly turn into gloom. With investment already at a very
high proportion to GDP, reneging on the peace process will
likely send the economy into a tailspin. As these lines are
written, there are mounting pressures on Netanyahu—from
the US administration and Europe, as well as from the large
domestic companies and foreign investors—to follow the
footsteps of the Rabin/Peres government. In this context, the
Likud’s loyalty to the ‘Washington Consensus’ of free markets
and sound finance makes it difficult to simultaneously fulfil its
dream of a ‘greater Israel’.
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1. The concept of differential accumulation was first introduced in Nitzan
(1992), were it was used as a basis for understanding stagflation as a
process of corporate restructuring. The significance of differential
accumulation for international political economy, with special emphasis
on energy conflicts in the Middle-East, is analysed in Nitzan and Bichler
(1995) and Bichler and Nitzan (1996b). An analytical model and
econometric analysis of differential accumulation in Israel is given in
Bichler and Nitzan (1996a).
2. This section draws on the detailed analyses in Nitzan, Rowley and Bichler
(1989), Rowley, Bichler and Nitzan (1989), Bichler, Rowley and Nitzan
(1989), Nitzan and Bichler (1995) and Bichler and Nitzan (1996b).
3. A detailed statistical analysis of the performance of the core groups is
given in Rowley, Bichler and Nitzan (1988) and Bichler (1991). The
emergence of the Israeli business elite and its interaction with the
political and military elites since the turn of the century are examined in
Frenkel and Bichler (1984). On the relations between the Israeli big
economy and the government, see Aharoni (1976, ch.6).
4. The period after the 1967 War saw a parallel duality arising in the labour
market, with the core sector increasingly confined to Jewish labour and
the small economy becoming dependent on cheap Palestinian workers
(Farjoun, 1978; 1980; 1983).
5. Note that this view, which attributes the post-1967 growth spell to
Palestinian proletarianization and market expansion is rejected by most
Israeli economists (see Tuma, 1989).
6. During the 1920s, Palestine had 70 commercial banks and 100 savings
and loans cooperative; by the 1970s, only five banking groups remained.
7. During the recession, the Histadrut (confederation of labour unions)
took over the workers’ pension funds. The funds were first used to boost
the ailing finances of companies related to the Histadrut. Eventually, the
Histadrut lost control to the chairman of Bank Hapoalim, Jacob
Levinson, who later committed suicide after the uncovering of his plan to
siphon some of his bank’s assets to his associates in the US. 
8. The first to endorse the new order of peace and globalization was the
military echelon, followed by the business elites. The politicians were last
in joining the peace wagon (Hakeynee, 1994).
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